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STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are set forth in full in addendum A
U.S.
U.S.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Fed.

Const. amend. IV
Const, amend. VI
Const, art. I, § 12
Const, art. I, § 14
Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1994)
Code Ann. § 32A-12-105(3) (1994)
Code Ann. § 32A-12-204 (1994)
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Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995)
Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (1995)
R. Evid. 702
R. Crim. P. 41(c)(2)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MR. MICKELSON SUFFERED FROM AN ACTUAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTED
HIS PERFORMANCE.
(Replying to State's brief at Point I, pp. 14-31)
A.

WHILE THE STATE SUPERFICIALLY GIVES
CREDENCE TO THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD,
IT IMPROPERLY APPLIES A MUCH STRICTER
STANDARD OF PREJUDICE THAN IS ACTUALLY
REQUIRED.

The State concedes, as it must, that the correct legal
standard for reviewing Mr. Mickelson's conflict of interest is as
set forth in Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708,
1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), as quoted in the conflict of interest

portion of Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984):
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim
warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of
prejudice. In Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S., at 345-350,
100 S.Ct., at 1716-1719, the Court held that prejudice
is

presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual

conflict

of interest.
In those circumstances, counsel breaches
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's
duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise
effect on the defense of representation corrupted by
conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel
to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial
courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely
to give rise to conflicts, see, e.g.. Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal justice
system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the
rule

is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists
for
the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice
is
presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel
"actively represented conflicting
interests"
and that "an
actual
conflict
of interest
adversely
affected
his
lawyer's
performance.
"
Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446
U.S., at 350, 348, 100 S.Ct., at 1719, 1718 (footnote
omitted).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067,
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696-7 (1984) (emphasis added).
While

conceding

the

above

test

applies,

the

State

essentially argues in terms of an actual showing of prejudice as
required for a typical ineffective assistance of counsel claim not
involving a conflict of interest.
is significantly less onerous.

The actual burden on appellant
State v. Johnson, 823 P. 2d 484

(Utah App. 1991) is illustrative.

In Johnson, this Court borrowed

a two part test from United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825 (11th
Cir.)(per curium), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S.Ct. 208, 74
L.Ed.2d 166 (1982) to assess whether an attorney's conflict created
a sufficient appearance of impropriety to require disqualification:
2

First, the court must find that there is "at
least a reasonable possibility that some specifically
identifiable impropriety" occurred because of the
representation. Id. (quoting Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir.1976)) . There need not
be proof of actual wrongdoing, however.
Id. at 829.
Second, the court must balance "the likelihood of public
suspicion or obloquy" against the social interest in
allowing the defendant to continue being represented by
the lawyer of his or her choice. Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828
(quoting Woods, 537 F.2d at 813 n. 12) .
Johnson, 823 P. 2d at 490. No actual impropriety was required; only
a "reasonable possibility."

Compare State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851

(Utah 1992) (announcing

per

defendant's

counsel

appointed

responsibilities,
representation
impropriety).

based

would

se rule of reversal when a criminal

on

be

has

the

concurrent

mere

compromised

and

prosecutorial

possibility
on

the

that

appearance

the
of

Only a reasonable possibility of a detriment to the

defendant is required.

A concrete showing of prejudice is not

required, yet the State seeks to impose such a requirement on
appellant here:
Example 1: Instead of addressing whether defense counsel
should have offered Mr. Bredehoft's testimony against the Mickelson
interests

in plea

bargaining

testimony

in exchange

for

(adverse

effect

concessions) , the

whether a plea bargain could have been achieved.
Point I.C.I., pp. 23-25.

=

not

State

offering

focuses

on

State's brief at

By ignoring the adverse effect, and

applying the incorrect reasonable prospect of a more favorable
result prejudice test, the State makes a superficially attractive
showing that an affirmative showing of prejudice cannot be made.

3

However, the State's argument is legally untenable because once the
adverse effect is shown, prejudice is presumed.
Example 2: Instead of addressing whether Mr. Mickelson's
conflict adversely affected the decision to have Mr. Bredehoft
testify (adverse effect = conflict caused counsel to want to put
Bredehoft on to testify that he was not intoxicated, so clubs are
not liable in dramshop suit), the State focuses on whether there
was an independent tactical reason to have Mr. Bredehoft testify.
State's brief at Point I.C.2., pp. 25-27.

By ignoring the adverse

effect, and applying the incorrect prejudice test, the State makes
a superficially attractive showing that the decision to place Mr.
Bredehoft on the stand was tactical, and thus cannot constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.

However, the State's argument

is legally untenable because once the adverse effect is shown,
prejudice is presumed.
Example 3:

Instead of addressing whether Mr. Mickelson's

conflict adversely affected the decision to have the bartender from
Charlie's Club testify (adverse effect = conflict caused counsel to
not investigate clubs and to want to put bartender on to establish
clubs did nothing improper), the State focuses on whether there was
an independent tactical reason to have her testify.
at Point

I.C.3., p. 28.

applying

the

incorrect

State's brief

By ignoring the adverse effect, and
prejudice

test,

the

State

makes

a

superficially attractive showing that the decision to have the
bartender

testify

was

tactical,

ineffective assistance of counsel.
4

and

thus

cannot

constitute

However, the State's argument

is legally untenable because once the adverse effect is shown,
prejudice is presumed.
Example

4:

Instead

of

addressing

whether

trial

references to Doug Mickelson adversely affected the representation
by creating the possibility that trial counsel's credibility was
impugned

(adverse effect = possibility that jury discounted Mr.

Mickelson7s arguments because they thought he was in cahoots with
Mr.

Bredehoft,

and

the

appearance

of

impropriety),

the

State

focuses on whether the references to Doug Mickelson were sufficient
to establish prejudice under the standard test.

By ignoring the

adverse effect, and applying the incorrect prejudice test, the
State makes a superficially attractive showing that an affirmative
showing of prejudice cannot be made and Mr. Bredehoft has not been
prejudiced.

However, the State's argument is legally untenable

because once the adverse effect is shown, prejudice is presumed.
Example

5:

Instead

of

addressing

only

the

adverse

effects alleged by appellant, the State additionally addresses Mr.
Mickelson's forensic trial performance.
I.C.5., pp. 29-30.

State's brief at Point

By ignoring the adverse effects, and applying

an incorrect standard ineffective assistance of counsel analysis,
the

State

makes

a

superficially

attractive

showing

Mickelson did not render ineffective assistance

However, the State's argument is irrelevant

because

Mr.

assistance

of

counsel

is

not

raising

claim.

He

5

is

a

normal

alleging

Mr.

in the normal

sense.

Bredehoft

that

a

surplusage
ineffective

conflict

of

interest.

Once the conflict and an adverse effect are shown,

prejudice is presumed.
The reasonable possibility that Mr. Mickelson's decisions
were affected by his conflict of interest establishes an adverse
effect, and mandates application of the presumption of prejudice
here.

No concrete showing of prejudice is required.

B.

MR. MICKELSON'S CONFLICT WAS NOT MERELY
HYPOTHETICAL.

The State asserts that any conflict between Mr. Bredehoft
and his counsel was hypothetical.

To the contrary, Mr. Mickelson

and/or his family members and corporations faced civil liability
both under the dramshop act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101

(Supp.

1997), and for punitive damages. Additionally, the Mickelsons and
their corporations potentially faced criminal liability for the
service of alcohol to Mr. Bredehoft that resulted in the death of
Sean Adkins.
A

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1994).
conflict

existed

because

of

the

possibility

of

compensatory and punitive damages against the corporations and Mr.
Bredehoft in a civil action.

Principles of comparative fault are

implicated, whereby the corporations can seek to avoid punitive
damages by making Mr. Bredehoft appear to be more responsible.1
Though the mere prospect of punitive damages against the Mickelsons
x

The State asserts that under the dramshop act "the fault of
dramshops and drunk drivers is never compared," State's brief at
21, but fails to discuss punitive damages at all. In seeking to
avoid punitive damages against themselves and their interests, the
Mickelsons' strategy must be to divert blame from themselves to Mr.
Bredehoft.
6

and their interests establishes that a conflict existed, history
has borne out the seriousness of the conflict.
dramshop

action brought

after

trial

In fact, in the

here punitive

damages

of

$500,000 were assessed against Mr. Bredehoft, $250,000 against
Uncle Bart's, and $100,000 against Charley's Club.

The total jury

award against the Mickelson clubs, as reduced by trial court, was
$750,000.

Exhibit D-9 at p. 9.2
The State asserts that the interests of Mr. Bredehoft

were aligned with those of Mr. Mickelson and his family members,
State's brief at 18, but this is not so.

The conflict created a

desire in Mr. Mickelson, conscious or subconscious, to develop
favorable
decision

evidence
to

differently.

have

for
Mr.

the

clubs.

Bredehoft

Absent

testify

the

might

conflict,
have

been

the
made

Except where self defense must be raised, it is rare

to have a homicide

defendant

testify.

Here, Mr.

Bredehoft's

testimony was subjected to devastating rebuttal.

Trooper Zdunich

had

concerning

previously

been

precluded

from

testifying

the

effects of alcohol on a person due to the prosecution's failure to
give advance notice that he would testify as an expert in this
area, R. 182 7, but as a result of Mr. Bredehoft's testimony opening
the door, he was permitted to testify concerning, inter

alia,

the

effects of various blood alcohol concentration levels on people and
2

The trial court refused to receive this exhibit based on
relevancy grounds, but included the exhibit in the record for
purposes of appeal. The actual result of the dramshop action is in
a sense irrelevant here. The conflict existed no matter what the
outcome. It was the possibility
of a dramshop action naming Mr.
Bredehoft, Mr. Mickelson, and the other Mickelson interests that
created the conflict.
7

their ability to drive.

See R. 1827-1847.

In light of the fact

that none of the boys present with the disabled Malibu saw a green
car force Mr. Bredehoft into the emergency lane, this defense was
unlikely to succeed.

Defense counsel could have attempted

develop this defense through expert testimony.

to

The decision to

have Mr. Bredehoft testify was adversely impacted by the conflict.
Additionally, as set forth in the opening brief at 18-19,
counsel

for Mr. Bredehoft

could

and

should

have

sought

plea

bargained concessions in exchange for cooperation with the State in
testifying against the Mickelsons and their clubs and corporations.
This created a direct conflict where the interests of Mr. Bredehoft
did

not

align

corporations.

with

those

of

the

Mickelsons

and

Mickelson

Mr. Bredehoft would have to testify that he was

intoxicated, that bar personnel were aware or should have been
aware of that fact, and that they continued to serve him alcoholic
beverages

in spite of that fact.

To avoid a conviction, the

Mickelsons would necessarily have to establish that Mr. Bredehoft
was not "apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages" and that it was not the case that they "knew or should
have known from the circumstances" that he was under the influence
of intoxicating alcoholic beverages. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12204, 32A-12-103 (1994).3
The State's argument that there was no criminal exposure
is unconvincing.

Possible criminal exposure for the Mickelson

3

The Mickelsons have effectively dodged this bullet. The two
year statute of limitations for class B misdemeanors has run. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1)(b) (1995).
8

corporations, rather than individuals, is sufficient to create a
conflict. The State does not argue that the corporations could not
have faced liability.
No

individual

conflict to exist.
Mr.

Mickelson's

Charlies Club."

criminal

liability

is necessary

for a

However, the record unambiguously shows that

father

managed

the

"day-to-day

operations

of

R. 2198. The most reasonable reading of § 32A-12-

103(2) would make him

"the officer or agent of the corporation or

association in charge of the premises in which the offense is
committed" who "is prima facie considered a party to the offense
committed, and is personally liable to the penalties prescribed for
the offense as a principal offender."

This court can and must find

that Doug Mickelson faced prima facie criminal liability for the
automobile homicide.4
The State makes much of Mr. Mickelson's

self-serving

testimony that he did not "see any criminal liability here on these
clubs' parts."

R. 2156.

It is indeed a novel proposition that a

criminal defendant, or an officer and owner of a corporate criminal
defendant, should be the final arbiter of whether there is any
criminal liability. Mr. Mickelson's apparent blindness to the true

4

Defense counsel failed to elicit that Mrs. Mickelson managed
the day-to-day operations of Uncle Bart's, and was similarly liable
for that club's involvement. The only reasonable inference from
the evidence is that Mrs. Mickelson's role in the other club was as
something more than a lowly employee, given that the Mickelsons and
their closely held corporations both owned and managed the club.
However, counsel's shortcoming in conclusively establishing this
fact is irrelevant, given Doug Mickelson's clear liability.
9

extent

of

the

conflict

only

highlights

the

problem

with

his

continued representation of Mr. Bredehoft.

C.

MR.
BREDEHOFT'S
REPRESENTATION
ADVERSELY AFFECTED.

WAS

The State relies on State v. Webb, 790 P. 2d 65 (Utah App.
1990)

for the

test

applicable

in the

joint representation

of

codefendants. However, the case at bar involves an actual conflict
between a criminal defendant and his lawyer, rather than a lawyer
representing

codefendants

who may or may not have

adverse

or

inconsistent defenses.
Mr.
testimony

Mickelson's

against

failure

himself,

his

to

offer

family

corporations was an adverse affect.
existed for not pursuing this option.

Mr.

members,

Bredehoft's
and

their

No sound tactical

reason

Conflict-free counsel would

have pursued this avenue of plea bargaining.

The State argues that

even if such a plea had been pursued it would have been rejected by
the prosecutor, but this is both highly speculative and irrelevant.
11

[A] defendant who shows that a conflict of interest

actually

.affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief."
335, 349-50,

Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.

100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).

Whether

or not such an offer would have been accepted, a fact which we can
never know,5 makes no difference.6
5|I

Where a conflict of interest

And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the
attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations
would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of
harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided
10

exists, only an adverse effect need be shown.
Point I.A.,

As set forth in

supra at 1, the State is attempting to engraft the

"reasonable likelihood of a better result" standard of typical
ineffective
interest

assistance of counsel claims into the conflict of

analysis,

something

which

Strickland

and

Sullivan

expressly prohibit.
The State discusses at length Mr. Mickelson's forensic
performance at trial, State's brief at 29-30, but this after-thefact second guessing is of precisely the type disavowed by the
Supreme Court in Holloway:
In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is
applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is
readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court
can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow
task of assessing the likelihood that the error
materially affected the deliberations of the jury.
Compare Chapman v. California, supra, at 24-26, 87 S.Ct.,
at 828-829, with Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
108, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2902, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), and
United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914-917 (CA9
1977) .
But in a case of joint representation of
conflicting interests the evil--it bears repeating--is in
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from
doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial
plea negotiations and in the sentencing process.

speculation." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491, 98 S.Ct.
1173, 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).
6

Though irrelevant, the State's observation that "experienced
prosecutors would never reduce a second degree felony charge
against the actual perpetrator of the homicide in exchange for his
testimony against the dramshops or their owners," State's brief at
24, is wide of the mark. Mr. Bredehoft could have bargained for
something short of reduction of the second degree felony charge,
such as dismissal of the three class B misdemeanor charges to which
he pled guilty. Thus, he may have avoided the consecutive sentence
imposed for those charges, see R. 300-307, and the State could
still have had its second degree felony conviction.
11

Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490, 98 S.Ct. at 1182.

The focus here must

be on Mr. Mickelson's continued representation in the face of a
conflict, his failure to inform the trial court of the conflict,
and the adverse effects the conflict had on the representation.
Prejudice

is presumed, and additional examples of

forensically

sound representation cannot affect the existence of the conflict
and its overarching effect on the total representation, or overrule
the presumed prejudice rule of Cuvler v. Sullivan.

Mr. Bredehoft

is entitled to a reversal.

POINT

11.
THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO SHOW THE
UNAVAILABILITY OF A TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANT.

(Replying to State's brief at Point II, pp. 32-44)
A.

CASES CITED BY APPELLANT ARE ON POINT AND
CONTROLLING.

The State attempts to distinguish the authority relied
upon by appellant in his opening brief at 3 5 by observing that
"These cases differ from the case at bar in critical ways:

none

involves a blood test, an intoxicated driver, or a homicide; none
discusses Schmerber; and all rely on rule 41(c) (2), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure."

State's brief at 37 n.14.

None of these

insignificant distinctions makes any difference.
First, Rule 41(c) (2)7 is merely the federal counterpart
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2), allowing for telephonic warrants.
The State cites no reason why federal courts addressing federal
cases arising in the districts of Colorado
7

(Cuaron, controlling

This rule is set forth verbatim in the addendum.
12

Tenth

Circuit

precedent),

Arizona

Western District of Washington
Illinois

(Talkinaton),

(Tarazon),

D.C.

(McEachin),

(Manfredi), Central District of

and Western District

of Texas

(Berick)

should cite to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) as authority for
federal officers to obtain telephonic warrants rather than the
federal authority in Rule 41(c) (2) .8
That the fourth amendment applies to searches in myriad
factual situations is hardly novel.

Given that blood draws are

only involved in drunk driving enforcement, it is not surprising
that these federal cases arising outside the drunk driving context
do not involve blood tests of intoxicated drivers.

For the same

reason, there is no reason why these cases would discuss Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1966).
Nonetheless, the fourth amendment is applicable to blood draws.
Skinner v. Rv. Labor Executives7 Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109
S.Ct. 1402, 1412, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989).
involves

an

intrusion

on

the

integrity

Because a blood draw
of

the

body,

fourth

amendment principles are particularly implicated.
The State cites no authority for the proposition that the
exigent circumstances exception is inapplicable to blood draws or
applies

differently.

Schmerber

directly

applied

exigent

circumstances jurisprudence to the intoxicated driver fact pattern,
noting:

8

Likewise, in addressing the authority of officers in Utah to
obtain telephonic warrants, this Court must address § 77-23-204(2) ,
rather than the federal analogue contained in Rule 41(c)(2).
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Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be
taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to
investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time
to seek out a magistrate and secure
a
warrant.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-1.

Had there been time to obtain a

warrant, exigent circumstances would not have been present and the
result in Schmerber, under identical reasoning, would have been
different.
With

the

advent

of

cellular

phones

and

wireless

technology, it is now considerably easier to obtain telephonic
access to magistrates than when Schmerber was decided.

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-23-204(2) and Rule 41(c)(2), Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, are both recognitions of this fact of modern existence.
As a result, now there is time to obtain a telephonic warrant in
many cases where, in 1966, such a warrant was unobtainable.

The

reasoning of Schmerber still applies, but the underlying facts are
different in that magistrates are now easily accessible by phone.
The

fourth

amendment

principles

authority cited by appellant are sound.

explicated

by

the

Cuaron, being a Tenth

Circuit decision, is controlling authority as to the scope and
meaning of the fourth amendment in this jurisdiction.

This Court

may not ignore this controlling authority and follow the cases
cited by the State, which are only persuasive but not controlling.

B.
The

State

IT DID NOT TAKE OVER TWO HOURS TO OBTAIN
A WARRANT IN LOPEZ.
argues

that

appellant's

assertion

that

a

telephonic warrant may be obtained in 24 minutes is a misreading of
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State v. Lopez, 676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984), asserting instead that it
in fact took over two hours to obtain a warrant in that case.

To

the contrary, the opinion states, "In this case, the record shows
that it took 24 minutes to obtain this warrant by telephone in
compliance with all of the statutory formalities."
at 397.

Lopez 676 P. 2d

The only statutory formality required prior to the actual

phone call would be preparation of the duplicate original warrant,
so that the magistrate can have the officer "read to him verbatim
the contents of the warrant."

While this may take a couple of

minutes, it certainly would not take an hour and forty minutes as
implied by the State.

The warrant only needs a court caption, a

statement ordering a peace officer to search or seize specified
persons or places, and a signature line indicating the officer is
signing for the magistrate pursuant to telephonic authority.

In

the intoxicated driver context, officers could have preprinted
forms

where

only

the

defendant's

magistrate needs to be inserted.

name

and

the

name

of

the

This would take mere seconds.

A

telephonic warrant is easily obtainable in under thirty minutes.

POINT III. APPELLANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS § 77-17-13
CLAIM.
(Replying to State's brief at Point III, pp. 44-49)
The State asserts that Mr. Bredehoft waived his § 77-1713 claim with respect to Dr. Middleton, contending that the trial
objection at R. 1244-1251 was not sufficiently specific.

In light

of all § 77-17-13 objections made during the course of the trial,
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defense counsel's renewed objection during the testimony of Dr.
Middleton fully preserved the issue.
Counsel first raised a § 77-17-13 objection on August 29,
1994, one day prior to the commencement of trial, concerning the
testimony

of

Trooper

Zdunich,

although

the

statute

was

not

specified by cite:
MR. MICKELSON:
My concern is the 10 to 12
days, four new witnesses have been identified on behalf
of the State. One just today as an expert which we need
to talk about too.
That's my concern, we might not
finish on Friday. I'm getting more and more concerned
about that part.
R. 501.
MR. MICKELSON:
The only other matter I'm
concerned about, so it doesn't tie us up in the afternoon
or mid-day, I was informed that the State intended to
call an additional expert witness, an Officer Deevenish[9]
from the Utah Highway Patrol regarding the -- I guess
effect of alcohol on people. This is the first notice I
have had of that witness.
I believe it is not in
compliance with the statutory section regarding notice of
experts, et cetera. There's been no written statement as
to what he is going to testify to. And I believe we
better air that issue now before we go any further, how
we handle that.
THE COURT: Ms. Hornak or Mr. Ybarra?
MR. YBARRA: Yes, your Honor. In preparation
on Friday it came to our attention that it would be
helpful to have an expert witness who can educate the
jury with regard to the effects of alcohol.
And we
didn't have any such witness already identified.
And
at that time we contacted
Trooper
Deevenish, who is a state expert, Utah Highway Patrol,
who has received extensive training with regard to the
effect of alcohol. He already happens to be the person
who calibrates intoxilizers, many intoxilizers throughout
the Valley. If I'm not mistaken, I believe Mr. Mickelson
is familiar with Trooper Deevenish, having
been

9

Though not clear from the transcript, it appears from later
argument that the trooper at issue is Trooper Zdunich.
See R.
1092.
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practicing in many DUIs.
So I believe he may be
generally familiar.
We anticipated Mr. Mickelson coming over. We
were going to discuss that with him. Unfortunately, that
didn't work out, so this morning -- we notified him
today.
We notified him that it was our intent.
I
discussed with him the nature of that testimony. Trooper
Deevenish has no personal knowledge of any of the facts
of this case. His only education to the jury is as to
the effect of that case.
THE COURT: There's no question that you did
not comply with the statute[10] notification of opposing
counsel in writing regarding the name of the witness and
the nature of the testimony.
MR. YBARRA: That's true. It only came to our
attention Friday as we were preparing our case in the
final form.
THE COURT:
When do you intend to use the
trooper?
MR. YBARRA:
He will be one of our later
witnesses. The earliest would be Wednesday afternoon.
THE COURT: May I ask you to do this, then:
Sometime before 9:00 tomorrow to comply with the statute,
to give Mr. Mickelson a proffer of the scope of the
testimony?
MR. YBARRA: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Then I will reserve ruling on this
until I can then hear from Mr. Mickelson regarding any
prejudice that can be gained by the use of this late
designated[11] witness.
MR. YBARRA: Yes, your Honor, we will be glad
do that.
R. 524-6

10

At this point, § 77-17-13 has not been mentioned by name, yet
the trial court's question indicates that the court is well
familiar with the statute.
l:L

The trial court is thus the first to use any form of
"designate" with respect to expert witnesses.
The State's
suggestion that defense counsel's objections had to do with the
State's "failure to 'designate' Dr. Middleton as an expert,"
State's brief at 48, is entirely correct.
Section 77-17-13
controls the disclosure of experts. No other statute discusses
designation of experts except § 77-14-3, concerning expert
testimony as to the mental state of a defendant, clearly not at
issue here.
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During the third day of trial on September 1, 1994, the
issue was again raised, primarily with respect to Trooper Zdunich,
but

also with

respect

to Dr. Middleton,

and the statute was

specifically identified:
THE COURT: The record will reflect we remain
outside the presence of the jury. The purpose of this
out-of-jury presence is to discuss whether or not -discuss the objections that Mr. Mickelson has made on
behalf of the defendant regarding the testimony of
Zabriskie.
MR. MICKELSON: Zdunich.
THE COURT: Prospective witness Zdunich. As I
recall, his objection was timely lodged at the beginning
of the trial regarding lack of notice as to the use of
the expert witness by the State. I advised the State at
that time to comply with the statute and to naming and
writing the witness and a brief description of contents
of its testimony. Whether or not that has been complied
with, I don't know.
Mr. Mickelson brought up in chambers an
objection which is ongoing as to the, number one, the use
of that witness and question if he is to be used, the
scope of his testimony, is that correct, Mr. Mickelson?
MR. MICKELSON: Yes, your Honor. As the Court
is aware, I first noted the State was going to use
Trooper Gary Zdunich Monday morning at, oh, at
approximately -- during a telephone call. This was later
disclosed to the court Monday afternoon after 3:30. And
Tuesday morning for the first time I received a Vita and
small half-page statement as to the nature of Trooper
Zdunich7 s testimony.
The State has also identify they were calling
him not as a lay witness or eyewitness but as an
expert
witness
under Section
77'-17-13(a).
The Rule
requires
there be disclosure
not less than 30 days before trial
or
ten days before a hearing.
Obviously
this cannot
occur
in this
case.
And further,
under that section
- - i t goes on
under Section
3 as to what should
occur should
the
prosecution
fail
to meet
the requirements
of
this
section.
It goes on to state:
The opposition
party
shall be, (a) entitled
to a continuance
of the trial
or
hearing
sufficient
to allow
preparation
to meet
the
testimony.
If the court finds that the failure
to comply
with this section
was a result
of bad faith
on the
part
of any party
or attorney,
the
court
shall
impose
appropriate
sanctions.
THE COURT: Reference
again that statute.
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MR. MICKELSON: Excuse me?
THE COURT: Reference
again the statute.
the

Give

cite.
MR.

MICKELSON:

77-17-13(3).

I

was

just

reading.
THE COURT: 77-17 sub 13.
Okay.
MR. MICKELSON: Since Monday we have attempted
to locate an expert to meet - - t o counter or respond to
the anticipated testimony of Officer Zdunich. As the
prosecution is well aware, those types of experts don't
exist in the State of Utah. These experts are troopers,
et cetera. Retired troopers, et cetera. As a result of
that we have been effectively precluded by this late
notice of even having an opportunity or chance to get an
expert in here to respond to the testimony of Officer
Zdunich. We believe there ou [gh]t to be sanctions in the
case, although I can't say it's in bad faith by the
prosecution -- he's got to give 30 days in advance.
Mr. Ybarra knows the difficulty of such ways
and has given us less than a day's notice before trial.
And we move the Court for the exclusion of that witness.
R. 1092-94 (emphasis added).
MR. YBARRA:
We 11, your Honor, we don' t
anticipate -- I believe
it is a Dr. Ray Middleton,
is
that
correct,
who is a medical
doctor
who lectures,
I
believe
itfs
LPS Davspring,
with regard
to those
issues
of the effect
of alcohol.
Our intent
was to show
that
the defendant
had been exposed
to this information,
and
it may be that we could,
during our examination
of him,
bring
out exactly
what he told
the defendant
in
that
regard.
However, it is not —it
wouldn't
necessarily
be
offered
for the proof of those
issues.
THE COURT: But the basis for me allowing you
to have someone testify as to what information may have
been given to the defendant was to allow you to use that
to support the proposition that he was aware of the
effects of alcohol upon someone and how that is
correlated with driving; correct?
MR. YBARRA:
Yes. And in that regard,
your
Honor,
I believe
Dr. Middleton
could
testify
in some
general
sense.
J don't
know that
he's
done
the
intoxications
that Trooper Zdunich has done and is
aware
of specifically
with regard to someone in a BA .27.
He' s
had experience with that. That's why it is different.
THE COURT: And I understand that regardless,
pursuant to my previous rulings, your Dr. Middleton would
be testifying as to what he presented in a class or
classes in which the defendant was present.
MR. YBARRA: That's correct.
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THE COURT: Anything
more, Mr.
Mickelson?
MR. MICKELSON: Yes.
. ..
And in regard
to Dr. Middleton,
this
is
the
problem we have been having in this case.
I have here a
copy of the State's witness list which was presented and
since that time the State has added Dr. Middleton. They
have added Officer Zdunich after the 10th of August.
Just prior to that one, I received another one which
didn't even have Dr. Lund or Melanie Hansen. This is in
the last ten days I get four new witnesses to deal with.

Now they identified
Dr. Middleton,
as you
correctly
recalled it, that he's coming in for the sole
purpose/ on the element of criminal negligence,
to
testify
to what their program at Davsvring Hospital
educated Mr. Bredehoft on, and that's not as an expert.
Now he'd suffer from the same vroblems if he was now
allowed to take and testify
as an expert witness on the
issue of the effects of intoxication
on a person.
THE COURT: Tell me how the prejudice - - b y the
fact that you have now received Zdunich's CV, as well as
a brief description of his testimony -- how you are
prejudiced.
MR. MICKELSON:
Your Honor, it's our belief
that the effects of alcohol affect different people
differently, depending on what they have eaten, their own
characteristics, their own metabolism, et cetera. And
given the opportunity to respond to this would allow us
to bring our own witness in so that if their witness got
on the stand, say [.]2[]7, they should be falling around,
stumbling around, we would have an expert that says it
depends. It depends on the person, this, this and that.
1098-1101 (emphasis added).
THE COURT:
As I read the statute, if you
request, we could continue this matter until you have had
time to get that. Or if I find that it is in bad faith,
I can take appropriate sanction. The wording of this
statute is inartfully done as far as I'm concerned. It
doesn't give me remedies, if I find no bad faith that
what to do is prejudice.
It does say, "You shall be
entitled to a continuance" if this matter is -- the
statute is not complied with and that is mandatory. It
says "shall."
Now procedurally and practically what are we
going to do? We are four days in this trial.
Mr. Ybarra?
1103.
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THE COURT: I'm making the finding there was
bad faith on the part of the State. So my question to
you: Are you making a motion to continue this trial?
MR. MICKELSON: That would be our only other
motion.
R. 1107.
THE COURT:
And you're reading the statute
correctly. Whether you're hearing me correctly or not,
I'm reading what the statute says. If the statute is not
complied with, and you wish to bring in that evidence,
then he is entitled --he shall be, not may. He shall be
entitled to a continuance, if you want to use that
evidence.
If I find bad faith, then I can take
appropriate actions.
R. 1108-9.
THE COURT:
I am going to take this under
advisement. We will proceed with testimony, other than
Trooper Zdunich, to complete as much as possible of the
case, absent his testimony, at lest until today. Have
Ms. Hornak and Mr. Ybarra talk over the lunch hour, maybe
a possibility would be to make the availability of
Zdunich prior to his testimony to Mr. Mickelson so that
he can know exactly what he is going to testify about,
and then he can have an expert as to those specific
grounds. And I say that's just a possibility.
MR. YBARRA: We would be glad to do that.
THE COURT:
I'm jammed up on this question.
I'm jammed up on this question. I don't want to continue
it. However, you didn't comply with the statute. The
statute says this is what happened and it didn't say may.
If it said may, then that's discretionary.
It says
shall.
That's mandatory.
He is requesting a
continuance.
R. 1110-1111.

Just prior to the lunch recess, for a total of

twenty transcript pages (R. 1092-1112), the attorneys and the court
discussed

§ 77-17-13

issues with respect

to the

testimony

of

Trooper Zdunich and Dr. Middleton.
After lunch, Trooper Jeff Peterson, crime lab analyst
Bruce Beck, and blood draw technician Brian Davis testified for
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approximately 120 transcript pages (R. 1113-1235).
testified
testimony.

next,

R.

1235-1252,

finishing

out

Dr. Middleton

the

afternoon's

Defense counsel repeatedly renewed his objection to

allowing Dr. Middleton to testify as an expert:
MR. MICKELSON: Objection, your Honor, again
rule on expert witnesses.
R. 1245.
MR. MICKELSON: Thank you, your Honor. Again
I renew my objection, again, under the rules on expert
witnesses, and I believe they have crossed the line on
that area, would ask the Court to follow the statute on
expert witnesses at this point.
THE COURT: I understand. Thank you. And as
I understand the proffered testimony, it's asking this
witness's opinion regarding the effects of a BA of .27
upon an individual based upon his training in the area
and experience and expertise. Is that correct, Mr. -MR. YBARRA: That is correct.
THE COURT: -- Ybarra? Thank you.
MR. MICKELSON:
Your Honor, as I understand
that calls for an expert opinion at this point in time,
again the State -R. 1246-7.
MR. MICKELSON: I understand that, your Honor,
I accept that part of it. At this point in time they
moving over into the expert opinion area with this witness
he was not designated as an expert witness to testify on
effects of -THE COURT: Your objection is noted.
R. 1247.
MR. MICKELSON: Again, your Honor, objection as
to -THE COURT: Qualified expert witnesses?
Thank you for objecting. . . .
R. 1248.
MR. MICKELSON: Your Honor, let me make this a
continuing objection at this point again.
I have no
problem with what he instructed people at various times
in 1987.
But as to opinions, as to persons with a
certain level of alcohol in their system, I'm going to
22

and
are
and
the

make that continuing objection. Any questions along that
line requires his opinion, then I will --my objection is
-- before I make a continuing objection on the failure to
follow the statute on expert witnesses.
R. 1249.
After 20 transcript pages of discussion of § 77-17-13
prior to lunch that same day, during which time the trial court
read the statute at least once and probably several times, there
can be no question that

the trial

court

understood defense

counsel's objection and the legal basis for it.

To suggest

otherwise is an insult to Judge Iwasaki's intelligence. This issue
is fully preserved.

* * *

Mr. Bredehoft relies on his opening brief in response to
those portions of the State's brief not directly addressed here.

CONCLUSION
Based on the

foregoing and his opening brief, Mr.

Bredehoft respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

y./
/

I./

W

•

day of January, 1998.

!

S&W-

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions

The

fourth

amendment

to

the

federal

constitution

provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a
preliminary examination, the function of that examination

is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec, 14 • [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1994) provides:
32A-12-103. Criminal
another

responsibility

for conduct of

In addition to Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, of the
Utah Criminal Code relating to criminal responsibility
for the conduct of another, the following principles
apply to violations of this title:
(1) If a violation of this title is committed by any
person in the employ of the occupant of any premises in
which the offense is committed, or by any person who is
required by the occupant to be or remain in or upon the
premises, or to act in any way for the occupant, the
occupant is prima facie considered a party to the offense
committed, and is liable
as a principal
offender,
notwithstanding the fact that the offense was committed
by a person who is not proved to have committed it under
or by the direction of the occupant.
Nothing in this
section relieves the person actually committing the
offense from liability.
(2) If a violation of this title is committed by a
corporation or association, the officer or agent of the
corporation or association in charge of the premises in
which the offense is committed is prima facie considered
a party to the offense committed, and is
personally
liable to the penalties prescribed for the offense as a
principal
offender.
Nothing in this section relieves
the corporation or association or the person who actually
mmitted the offense from liability.

Emphasis added.

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204 (1994) provides:
32A-12-204. Unlawful
persons

sale

or supply

to intoxicated

A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to
any person who is apparently under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or
to a person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic
beverage knew or should have known from the circumstances
was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs.

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1994)12 provided:
32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from
distribution of alcoholic beverages--Causes of
action--Statute
of
limitations--Employee
protections
(1) A n y person w h o directly gives, sells, o r
otherwise provides liquor, o r at a location allowing
consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, t o
the following persons, and b y those actions causes the
intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries i n
person, property, o r means of support t o a n y third
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third
person, resulting from the intoxication:
(a) any person under the age of 21 y e a r s ;
(b) any person who is apparently under the
influence of intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or
products or drugs;
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the
alcoholic beverage knew or should have known from
the circumstances was under the influence of
intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or

drugs;

or

(d) any person who is a known interdicted
person.
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its
employees in violation of this chapter.
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The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, only corrects the
statutory cite to the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act, and effects no
substantive change.

(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection
(1) has a cause of action against the person who provided
the alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection (1).
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under
this chapter dies, the rights or liabilities provided by
this chapter survive to or against that person's estate.
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded
to any person pursuant to a cause of action under this
chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is limited to
$100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to
all persons injured as a result of one occurrence is
limited to $300,000.
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under
this chapter shall be commenced within two years after
the date of the injury.
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of
action or additional recovery against the person causing
the injury.
(8)
(a) A sanction or termination of employment
may not be imposed upon any employee of any
restaurant,
airport
lounge,
private
club,
on-premise
beer
retailer,
or
any
other
establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a
result
of the employee
having
exercised
the
employee's independent judgment to refuse to sell
alcoholic beverages to any person the employee
considers to meet one or more of the conditions
described in Subsection (1).
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or
imposes sanctions on the employee contrary to this
section is considered to have discriminated against
that employee and is subject to the conditions and
penalties set forth in Title 34, Chapter 35, the
Utah Antidiscriminatory A c t .
Emphasis added.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13
77-17-13.
Expert
requirements.

(1995) provides:

testimony

generally--Notice

(1)
(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to
call any expert to testify in a felony case at trial or
any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the
opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than
3 0 days before trial or ten days before the hearing.
Notice shall include the name and address of the expert,
the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's
report.

(b) The expert shall prepare a written report
relating to the proposed testimony.
If the expert has
not prepared a report or the report does not adequately
inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons
of that opinion, the party intending to call the expert
shall provide to the opposing party a written explanation
of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient to give
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by
the expert when available.
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the
expert's report, the party receiving notice shall provide
notice to the other party of witnesses whom the party
anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony,
including the name and address of any expert witness and
the expert's curriculum vitae.
If available, a report
of any rebuttal expert shall be provided.
If the
rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report
does not adequately inform concerning the substance of
the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to
call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written
explanation
of the witness's
anticipated
rebuttal
testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate
notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a
copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when
available.
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to
meet the requirements of this section, the opposing party
shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the
testimony.
If the court finds that the failure to
comply with this section is the result of bad faith on
the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose
appropriate sanctions.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2)

(1995) provides:

(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do
so in the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may
be issued upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is
not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided
the magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists
for the issuance of the warrant.
The sworn oral
testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be
recorded and transcribed.
After transcription, the
statement shall be certified by the magistrate and filed
with the court.
This statement shall be deemed to be an
affidavit for purposes of this section.

Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.

Rule

41(c)(2),

Federal

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure,

provides:
(2) Warrant Upon Oral Testimony.
(A) General Rule. If the circumstances make it
reasonable to dispense, in whole or in part, with a
written affidavit, a Federal magistrate judge may issue
a warrant based upon sworn testimony communicated by
telephone or other appropriate means, including facsimile
transmission.
(B) Application. The person who is requesting
the warrant shall prepare a document to be known as a
duplicate original warrant and shall read such duplicate
original warrant, verbatim, the Federal magistrate judge.
The Federal magistrate judge shall enter, verbatim, what
is so read to such Federal magistrate judge on a document
to be known as the original warrant.
The Federal
magistrate judge may direct that the warrant be modified.
(C) Issuance. If the Federal magistrate judge
is satisfied that the circumstances are such as to make
it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit and
that the grounds for the application exist or that there
is probable cause to believe that they exist, the Federal
magistrate judge shall order the issuance of a warrant by
directing the person requesting the warrant to sign the
Federal magistrate judge's name on the duplicate original
warrant. The Federal magistrate judge shall immediately
sign the original warrant and enter on the face of the
original warrant the exact time when the warrant was
ordered to be issued. The finding of probable cause for
a warrant upon oral testimony may be based on the same
kind of evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon
affidavit.
(D) Recording and Certification of Testimony.
When a caller informs the Federal magistrate judge that
the purpose of the call is to request a warrant, the
Federal magistrate judge shall immediately place under
oath each person whose testimony forms a basis of the
application and each person applying for that warrant.
If a voice recording device is available, the Federal
magistrate judge shall record by a means of such device
all of the call after the caller informs the Federal

magistrate judge that the purpose of the call is to
request a warrant. Otherwise a stenographic or longhand
verbatim record shall be made.
If a voice recording
device is used or a stenographic record made, the Federal
magistrate judge shall have the record transcribed, shall
certify the accuracy of the transcription, and shall file
a copy of the original record and the transcription with
the court. If a longhand verbatim record is made, the
Federal magistrate judge shall file a signed copy with
the court.
(E) Contents. The contents of a warrant upon
oral testimony shall be the same as the contents of a
warrant upon affidavit.
(F) Additional Rule for Execution. The person
who executes the warrant shall enter the exact time of
execution on the face of the duplicate original warrant.
(G) Motion to Suppress Precluded.
Absent a
finding of bad faith, evidence obtained pursuant to a
warrant issued under this paragraph is not subject to a
motion to suppress on the ground that the circumstances
were not such as to make it reasonable to dispense with
a written affidavit.

